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* 
First I should probably write some clarifying words about why I am concerned 
about, and why I feel interested in the current questions of “university philosophy” 
as connected to the possibilities of applied philosophy? The first and most direct 
reference point is the fact that I myself exist in a philosophy department, and it is my 
activity there that provides the financial basis for the subsistence of my family and 
myself. To put it briefly: our source of living is that I, as an employee, “teach” 
some “disciplines” traditionally called “philosophical” at the faculty of philosophy 
in Cluj! Then again – secondly – I “teach” these subjects, or rather, I try to “teach” 
them so that I am genuinely and constantly interested in the inquisitive and explicit – 
recte: applied philosophical – thematization or activization of the challenges of the 
meanings of philosophizing.  
 However, I might also add, I could actually teach here (too) even if all that 
would not interest me at all with such an organic and genuinely philosophical 
involvement and horizon… Therefore I could manage the academically compulsory 
“introductory” and “concluding” references to the “usefulness and harmfulness” of 
things by enlisting a series of references and quotes, accessible everywhere in fact, 
by the trendiest figures of contemporary philosophical publicity in addition to some 
“classics”, as a proof that the issues “minced” during the “lectures” are indubitably 
“weighty” and “timely”… 
 All these are rendered especially timely for me, in a genuine, that is, 
existential, and not merely circumstantial sense, by the particular challenges of the 
so-called “Bologna process”. Namely, primarily precisely the fact that the new 
impulses and symbolically veiled constraints and traps to “instrumentalize” 
philosophy may be hiding in several basic sense in these urging “calls”. Now, I am 
especially sensitive and fastidious for such things, for reasons equally “historical”, 
deriving from our recent past, and “personal”, of my own “life history”… 
 “Chair philosophy” of course cannot – and indeed, must not – be mistaken 
for philosophy pursued and professed at different departments or faculties of various 
universities in the course of time. For we are well aware that epochal and school-
founding thinkers taught on various universities, and also that teaching was an 
organic part of the creation of their life work. So much so that – say, a Fichte, a 
Schelling or a Hegel, etc. – often moved from one university to another to find the 
most appropriate ground for elaborating and professing their ideas. We are also 
aware of course that there are several prominent thinkers of the “history of 
philosophy” who never got involved with any faculty of philosophy, or only for 
short periods of time and as a sidetrack. However, this does not affect at all their 
“importance for the history of philosophy”… 
 “Chair philosophy” is therefore not merely defined by the fact that it notes a 
kind of philosophy which is cultivated and professed in the context and institution of 
university departments (chairs). On the contrary, it is primarily characterized by its 
not being philosophy, but it only turns – or rather transforms, dissects – 
philosophy into an object, a thing in the institutional context of universities. So that, 
meanwhile, it also changes it into some kind of instrument or technology. In other 
words: “chair philosophy” practically objectivizes philosophy. Yet it does this in a 
way that it presents itself as “the” philosophy – and it is again very important to 
emphasize, in order to make it clear from the very beginning, that I do not argue 
here against the diligent and useful didactic, pedagogical, mediating, text 
interpreting, editing, translating etc. work of philosophy professors including 
myself, I only investigate and thematize “chair philosophy”. Which, in fact, is 
nothing else or nothing more than – with Heidegger’s word – “science of 
philosophy”.  And this is why chair philosophy is not “useless”, for it satisfies 
the everyday needs in education, culture, politics, society, mentality, as well 
as entertainment and “intellectual” social needs for philosophy as object. 
 “Chair philosophy” therefore – to put it briefly – can be regarded as a 
non-philosophical, institutionalized condition, a hypostasis (and not merely 
“method”) of philosophy as an object alienated from itself, created by the 
primarily technical – that is, artificial – instrumentarium and dissection of 
the mostly merely terminological results of the sui generis philosophical 
accomplishments of the originally also sui generis philosophical urges 
outlined in the course of the “history” or tradition of thinking. In other words: 
“chair philosophy” is characterized by the rule of “methods” understood and 
applied as procedural and management techniques and “problems” 
understood as technical terms.  
 I’d like to repeatedly emphasize that chair philosophy is not merely or 
primarily a possible “method” of practicing philosophy but it increasingly 
becomes a condition of philosophy in which philosophy is done or treated, 
designed, produced and distributed as a thing. No matter whether this thing 
is a kind of “concept”, “discourse”, “method” or “technique”. In this sense 
“chair philosophy” is indeed a special historical “product” of university-level 
teaching of philosophy, the “results” of which – the products of the 
“profession” or “job” of teaching philosophy – increasingly turn into 
commodities. Commodities which have their own “price”. This “price” can 
have of course a monetary expression, but it can be more or less considerable 
also in a symbolic sense.  
 On this account “chair philosophy” is extremely sensitive – should I 
not say alertly “pliable” – to all kinds of environmental (even market-) 
“effects” and “changes”. First of all, these are the changing “intellectual” 
fashions, modern “trends”, all kinds of circumstances and institutional 
modifications. Each of these is a requirement for any self-respecting chair 
philosophy. Since these are which “whisper” us what is worth studying, and 
also how. While the slogan of “chair philosophy” cannot be other in this 
respect than adaptation, alignment and keeping up!  
 Mainly if this is what makes every kind of “chair philosophy” always 
“timely” and “opportune”. So: directly and literally always “most recent”. For any 
philosophy that is not “most recent”, cannot possibly be a sellable commodity these 
days. Not even at the universities. Therefore such a thing can by no means make the 
university institution a sellable product. Such a “thing” is thus a needless waste of 
money, time and energy, since it is usually unmarketable. No surprise therefore that 
the politicians, managers and bookkeepers of science allocate no funds for it, no 
promotions or pay raises, grants, stipends, etc. 
 “Chair philosophy” is therefore a historical thing. Its history begins of 
course with the medieval history of the creation of the first universities. Since these 
universities were evidently under the rule of theology, the discipline of philosophy 
only had a subsidiary, ancillary role, often being termed as a “servant”.1 As a result 
of this tradition, it later became typical – and remained so for quite a long time – that 
the historically most significant thinkers did not, and could not have chairs at 
universities. This tendency “is still functional in the 18th century, … the really 
productive philosophical thinking – with Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche, Leibniz 
– develops outside the university”. The philosophy that can be called “new” and 
“innovative” in the most profound and genuine sense – originally cultivated outside 
universities – only enters the universities at the mid- or late-18th century with Wolff, 
Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. However, there had always been historically 
highly significant “outsiders” during the entire 19th century who could not fit 
philosophically – that is: existentially – into the institutional system of universities; 
let us only think of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche or Kierkegaard. 
                                                 
1
 See for example Károly Redl, “A fakultások vitájának előtörténetéhez” (To the history of 
the debate of faculties), in Az európai egyetem funkcióváltozásai – Felsőoktatás-történeti 
tanulmányok (Functional changes in European universities – Studies in the history of higher 
education), ed. Tamás Tóth (Budapest: Professzorok Háza, 2001), 57–72. 
 The actual, explicit and probably long-lasting – at any rate, today still 
unpredictably long-lasting – connection of philosophy and the university of 
philosophy only happened in the 20
th
 century. Although this century also displays 
significant exceptions, such as Emil Cioran, or philosophers who were denied a 
university chair for reasons ideological or political, such as Czech thinker Jan 
Patočka, the Romanian Constantin Noica, or the Hungarian Béla Hamvas, or, 
temporarily, George Lukács and some his disciples. However, almost all of these 
thinkers operated a kind of “private university or seminar-like” home school, even if 
the kind of instruction offered there resembled more the Greek paideia than the 
“systematic” education of medieval or modern universities. Therefore none of this 
had anything to do with any kind of “chair philosophy” or, even less, with any kind 
of politically accepted, “official” chair philosophy. Just the opposite, they found 
themselves precisely at intellectual, philosophical and existential war with these! 
 The decisive development of the connection between philosophizing and the 
university of philosophy, even amidst the current tendencies, is what is lately 
frequently called the professionalization of philosophy. Richard Rorty places the 
beginning of this process to the second half of the 20
th
 century, more precisely the 
period following WWII.
1
 (From this time on, the increasing majority of those who 
dealt with philosophy for a living – as if by itself, without any kind of visible or 
explicit external constraint – has decided and still decides that philosophy should 
deal with primarily technical issues emerging within its own inner contexts… This is 
what the still existing criticism called Glasperlenspiel, a glass pearl game played 
amidst changing desire for texts and archives.)
2
 
 However, the professionalization of philosophy – in recent years 
increasingly happening amidst the conditions of growing globalization – changes the 
parameters and outlines of chair philosophy as well. Or, more accurately: blurs. For, 
whereas the outlines of chair philosophy have been drawn for centuries in 
opposition with those active outside university chairs on the one hand, and also 
those who have been an alternative for the former, namely people active in academic 
research institutions on the other hand, the professionalization of philosophy tends to 
increasingly blur or homogenize these differences. There is hardly any difference 
these days between the professional “chair philosophy” of university departments, 
and the also “professional” philosophizing in academic research institutions. Both 
places are inhabited by professional “philosophers”, experts and “craftsmen” of 
philosophy, who, to maintain their careers, carefully watch the applications of 
various institutions and foundations, their requirements, topics, and the “currents” 
worth keeping in mind when proposing their conference papers and research 
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 See Richard Rorty, “Philosophy in America Today,” The American Scholar 2 (1982): 183–
187. 
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/41210815?uid=3738920&uid=2&uid=4&sid=211029
74767571, accessed 4 November 2013. 
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 See Ludger Lütkehaus, “Fachgigante und Lebenszwerge – Vom fehlenden Nutzen der 
Universitätsphilosophie für das Leben,” Die Zeit 21/2001, 
http://hermes.zeit.de/pdf.index.php?.doc=/archiv/20001/21/200121_philosophie.xml. 
accessed 25.10.2008 
projects. Including also the methods and “expected results” of discussion and 
research. For “unexpected” results cannot count on any kind of “patronage”. Not to 
mention that precisely these characters will become the decision-makers of science 
and organized thinking who will shape things perspectively in accordance with these 
criteria and of course their own standards. Both downwards and upwards.  
 Therefore it is more and more visible nowadays that chair philosophy is – 
and in fact always has been – an actually “unphilosophical” “condition” of 
philosophy, manipulated or directly asking for manipulation. So Schopenhauer’s 
classic statement about university policies that the true purpose of university 
philosophy is to guide the deepest thinking of students towards the intellectual 
direction that they consider adequate for professorial appointments is essentially still 
valid today… This kind of chair philosophy cannot be serious, only school 
philosophy, which does not illuminate the darkness of our existence. Indeed, chair 
philosophy is sometimes reproached to be “alienated”, to avoid highly relevant 
current existential problems, and instead it closes up into documents and archives, 
sterile and hermaphrodite interpretations of purportedly “historical” or “timely” 
texts, and the exegetical tossing-around of letters, punctuation marks, and concepts, 
especially trendy ones. Meanwhile, of course, chair philosophy works still as 
“official”, dominant philosophy, at least insofar as the university of philosophy itself 
works as a kind of office of philosophy, and at the same time it is in an official 
relationship with the supporters of the university and the institutions involved in 
educational policy making, direct or indirect control, supervision, award or 
assessment. 
 The so-called “Bologna process” also risks being just another impulse in 
instrumentalizing philosophy, despite its emphatic references to the challenges that 
higher education has to face in creating a unitary Europe and the problems of quality 
and usefulness involved in this educational process. There is a probability and also a 
risk therefore that this process offers further incentive and legitimacy precisely to 
chair philosophy. And, what is more, amidst and ever wider, globalizing framework 
of the professionalization of philosophy. For the “Bologna process” aims in fact at 
mass higher education, in addition of course to also make it more efficient. But 
“mass education” does not mean here that more students get admitted to the 
university, but first of all that university education is about to increasingly mean a 
mere expert training course. That is to say: a mere adaptation to the ever more varied 
and “pluralistic” conditions of a constantly changing and globalizing labour market.  
 However, as far as “pluralism” is concerned, it should not lead us astray, for 
mostly it is only apparently the transgression of the professionalization and 
disciplinarization of philosophy. On the contrary, in the context of philosophy’s 
becoming a profession, pluralism actually consecrates a kind of parallel discussion 
about various topics, a priori differentiated even in matters of world view. While of 
course “pluralism” strongly manipulates the thematic and intellectual parameters of 
research as well as the addressees of investigations and inquiries. Who, by the way, 
always complain that they cannot “review” and “follow” the mass of “information” 
and the “bibliography” of their subjects.  
 The professionalization of philosophy implies first of all the 
overrepresentation of problems of a technical kind, of “specialization”, as well as 
“disciplinarization” deriving from aversion of contexts and questions which are not 
self-sufficient, and therefore brings about an emphatic idiosyncrasy. A kind of 
idiosyncrasy of course which coexists well with the dominance of texts, whether 
seen as the hermaphrodite idiosyncrasy of interpretations and readings, etc., or as the 
idiosyncrasy of automatic disciplinary urges forcing the creation of new and new 
disciplines termed “philosophical”, such as “problematology”, “peratology”, 
“thanatology”, “grammatology”, etc. These of course generate the process of the 
“self-breeding” of “problems”, including those which are circumstantially born out 
of the trendy and timely topics of an application, a grant or a conference rather than 
the constraints of actual existential experiences. This happens in close connection 
with the permanent and overwhelming constraint of publication and conference 
attendance, which does not in fact meet sui generis communication needs – what 
Karl Jaspers rightly considered one originating factor of philosophy itself – but 
mostly only functions as a measuring tape of “accomplishments”. And, what’s more, 
because of which the place of “schools” and “-isms” is taken these days by ever 
growing numbers of “disciplines” and schematized “procedures”.  
 It is perhaps only a further evidence of these problems and difficulties that 
the type of higher education now advocated by the Bologna Agreement could mean 
in fact “convertible universities”. These, accordingly, would “train” mass-
professionals with locally or globally convertible “skills” and “reliability”, rather 
than free, responsible and engaged inquirers and thinkers. All the more so as these 
latter ones cannot just be “trained”… 
 This however – although quite probable – is not necessary as well! For – at 
least in liberal democracies – there is “always” a possibility to discover once in a 
while the simplest thing that: philosophy can only be taught by philosophizing 
even at university level, regardless of the fact that the direct audience – the 
students – would want to invest their scholarships or tuition fees for 
“philosophy itself” or exchange it for other horizons (“instrumentalization”). 
For there is no hope – fortunately! – that any kind of truly philosophical “text” 
can be voiced without approaching its questions with our own questions and 
inquiries… And without this voicing becoming an appeal or warning for the 
audience that they need to ask their own explicit – and simply irreplaceable!! – 
questions about the matter of “texts” as well! 
 For the problematic way leading us back and forth to philosophy and our 
own possibilities is not a different one, therefore the all-time contact with 
philosophy – whether as a professor, a student, or a “social” or “institutional” one – 
cannot be “easier” or “more accessible”, nor “harder” and “more incomprehensible” 
than the journey to ourselves, open to possibilities, limitations and challenges, and 
burdened with the responsibilities of communication, and leading through the beings 
amidst our partaking in being. And since this is what any authentic philosophy 
always and only undertakes, what would be just enough for the current, living 
“operation” of the university of philosophy, is, I think: philosophy “itself”! Without 
“chair philosophy”! 
 
*** 
 
It is certainly not accidental that Immanuel Kant, thinking about the “conflict of the 
faculties”, and trying to define the place and role of the faculty of philosophy within 
university systems, discusses the university of philosophy, essentially and clearly, 
primarily as a place of freedom, or what is more, as the forum of freedom.
1
 
Clearly, Kant thinks of the university itself as a forum, while he treats the university 
of philosophy in fact as the forum of freedom. That is to say, not merely as a place 
of exchange of knowledge and skills, or a man production called “training”.  
 Nevertheless, the university of philosophy can only be a place or even a 
forum of freedom, if it can discuss anything as a place for the public use of the 
mind. “Discussion” however means nothing else than the encounter with someone or 
something in questioning or in the uttered question itself. And, what is more, the 
encounter – or rather: confrontation – not only with the question or the “partner”, 
but with ourselves as well. Therefore the community of professors and students as a 
forum of freedom can only be formed on faculties of philosophy if it means an 
encounter in questioning – that is, in search and self-search –, practiced by, and as a 
right of the public use of the mind, and permanently reiterating, validating and 
rearticulating this right and practice. And this is of course not unconnected to what 
is called in philosophy for thousands of years the “search for the truth”. With all its 
“relativity”. So it is no accident that already Aristotle connects the basic name 
questions – the “categories” – of the search for being to the agora… 
 The truth can only be searched therefore, both on the agora and at the 
university of philosophy, freely by free people: as a responsible and historical act of 
freedom. As people who interact in no other ways than in various situations – or 
positions in a “phenomenological” sense – of serious self-search. And it is only the 
difference of this “position”, this situation and the implications that constitutes it – 
and not of their relationship with the current set of knowledge or skills – that 
essentially and primarily distinguishes between one professor or student or another. 
And not the length of a list of publications or the frequency of conference 
attendance! Such things can only be derivative, even if utterly organic (although 
hopefully more and more rarely). 
 So, with regard to its essence and meaning, the university of philosophy – 
even if it were only a “factory-like” setting of “philosophical science” – could not 
have any other purpose than what philosophy itself derives from: the problematic, 
historical and factually accepted ontology of human freedom! Which, regarding its 
being and structure of being, is in fact identical, or rather: coincidental with the 
existential, ontological – and not “epistemological”, “political philosophical” or 
“moral philosophical” – and always factual structure of questionability and 
questioning. The university of philosophy gains thus its positive and essential 
meanings not from ministries and political parties, not from churches or various 
international agreements (Bologna or other), but from philosophy itself and its 
historical embeddedness – that is, not merely from its possible timely “usefulness or 
uselessness”. That is, from the historical urges and meanings of being of philosophy 
itself, which often have not even reached the universities of philosophy… 
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 Immanuel Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties (Der Streit de Facultaten), trans. and introd. 
Mary J. Gregor (New York: Abaris Books, 1992), 29. 
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Even more directly: the actual purpose of philosophy “training” in higher 
education or of the university of philosophy itself, with regard to its essence and 
meaning, cannot be anything else than the questionability of the historical human 
freedom and the historically possible autonomous human being! Both in a 
“community” and an “individual” sense. And with the clarification that no kind of 
community – let alone an “autonomous” community – is or can be possible without 
autonomous individuals! 
 Therefore an even more direct purpose – and not some exclusive “object”, 
“task” or subject – of the university of philosophy is the historical or social 
autonomous individual, a prerequisite for communities. And of course both for the 
presence of professors and students at the universities, and for the public “rational 
use” of researches! This is why the university of philosophy and the work that 
happens there cannot be especially popular. At most for a short while, due to 
fashion or circumstances. Since nothing is more suspicious, unpleasant or 
uncomfortable – to be sure, even for the “individual” itself – than precisely the 
“autonomous individual”! That’s why all the “movements” and organizations that 
usually quite whole-heartedly activate for all kinds of (primarily “community”) 
“autonomies” showed not much zeal for it. However, no movements are generally 
initiated for the autonomous individual, if for no other reason, than because all such 
endeavour would be a burden of philosophy and its derivative “institutions”.  
 The autonomous individual
1
 is of course not the individuum – whose name 
hints to its indivisibility, atomization rather than its “one-I”-ness – nor a (more or 
less) isolated human being (no matter how well prepared professionally or how well 
“socialized”), but only the one who, conscious of his unrepeatability, is in 
possession of one’s own property (his wealth, including his mind and all 
competences and skills gained on behalf of his mind) as well as one’s own 
conscience. Who exists, with all his “skills”, first of all with regard to the 
responsibility of the problematic possibilities that he himself has acknowledged and 
undertaken. [It is no accident that the Greek name of the fundamental Aristotelian 
category – the ousia – originally meant precisely property and wealth, and by this, 
the “(basic) value” that counts as the foundation of being. That to which, by the 
direction of taking into possession, one must and should pursue. And which, 
therefore, is always questionable because of its importance, and which, on this very 
account, is the essence itself. This original sense of the Greek word of ousia is of 
course preserved and utilized to the full by the sui generis philosophy of Aristotle’s 
categorial thinking.
2
] 
 Probably any time and any place – even at the universities of philosophy – 
when and where philosophy, or at least an invitation to true philosophy, happened 
indeed, then it happened precisely with regard to, or as, something similar. For 
“reflection” – just like the related “meditation” – hardly means anything else than 
the meditative caring for he who, as he takes part in being, is able, and in fact indeed 
forced, to think – and act – about (his) being in a timely and actual way, in its all-
time problem of being and with regard to his essential, historical and ultimately 
encounter-oriented possibilities (of being). Therefore the issue of the autonomous 
                                                 
1
 The Hungarian term “egyén”, meaning ’individual’ is a compound meaning “one-I”. 
(Translator’s note). 
2
 For more on this, see my study “The Future, Or Questioningly Dwells the Mortal Man… 
Question-Points to Time”, Philobiblon – Transylvanian Journal of Multidisciplinary 
Research int he Humanities XV (2010): 92–118. 
being, as also that of freedom, is in fact not a matter of moral, legal or political 
philosophy, but an essential historical, existential and ontological question. This is 
why primarily “chair philosophies” try so hard to escape it, often even in the name 
of “philosophy”, as something that, as “autonomy”, belongs not the individual, but 
to the community. In other words: thoughtlessly opposing the individual and its 
communities, as well as the communities and the individuals in them. 
 
*** 
 
Now, with regard to the “Bologna Process” in the field of philosophy, it is 
important to notice, with regard to the determination of the situation, that it was 
actually prepared, and still articulated, by the professionalization of philosophy, or 
rather by professional “philosophy”. Of course, in close connection with chair 
philosophies. That is to say, with regard to philosophy, the Bologna Process is 
outlined “philosophically” by something which is, from the very beginning, 
primarily subservient to the needs of the labour market. And it can only be rightly 
understood in this horizon how the qualification structure of higher education 
follows both the needs of “knowledge-based society” and the labour market, 
oriented in the same direction.  
 It is clear therefore what kind of knowledge they mean when talking about 
the knowledge needs or requirements of a “knowledge-based” society. Such that is 
primarily shaped by labour market conditions! Moreover, it is well “cared for” by 
the systems of applications; the role that the successful results of such applications 
have in the assessment and promotion of professors, usually expressed and measured 
in points; and the manipulation techniques of forcing them into all kinds of work 
teams that university institutions and their professional staff would indeed conform 
to these “epistemologically” speaking hardly organic expectations.  
 So there is nothing to wonder that the subjects of the annual Romanian 
“grants” launched by the national council – probably held “most respectable” 
precisely because these contracts make the biggest income for the universities, the 
highest recognition for the leaders of these institutions, and the most “valuable” 
points for the promotion of professors – contain not a single “priority field” that 
could possibly include any kind of sui generis philosophical research…1 
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 It becomes increasingly clear in fact that these so-called “grants” do not mean “paid 
research”, but such that are already endorsed by those in power, regarding both their 
subjects and their methodologies. Which are usually “promoted”, firstly with regard to things 
connected to philosophy, in the name of ruling spiritual public opinion, symbolic powers, 
and related – established and predictable – “trendy” actualities. It is no accident therefore 
that – and let me hint now to a personal experience – it has been completely impossible to 
gain any financial support or “grant” around here for a philosophical research on euthanasia 
which would radically analyze this – from their perspective – admittedly “sensitive” topic, 
digging deeper than public opinion and current spiritual trends in general. See also my study 
on euthanasia: “Euthanasia, Or Death Assisted to (Its) Dignity,” Philobiblon – Transylvanian 
Journal of Multidisciplinary Research in Humanities XVII/2 (2012): 335–354. Whereas the 
Bioethics Research Centre of Babeş-Bolyai University in Cluj was founded and is operated 
under the authority of theology – Orthodox theology, but this not important now… Such 
 All these of course are quite telling as to the real nature of the loudly 
advocated adaptation to the “labour market”, and also of how far the construction 
sites of the so-called “knowledge-based society” are actually guided by the “market” 
– even if not the “marketplace”, the agora. The most surprising is – although, as I 
have said, there is nothing to be surprised about – that not only am I not aware of 
any public position or argued stance against this on behalf of the “craftsmen” of 
philosophy around here, but I tend to see rather that such a state of things is mostly 
accepted with almost natural “reflexes” of “catching-up”! This may also illustrate 
that the reunited team of professional philosophy and chair philosophy, with no 
useless sweat, is engaged in a predictably victorious, and of course always fairly 
judged and scored match with… nobody knows who any longer. It may perhaps be 
that it is not the “market” but only professional and chair philosophy that is 
victorious here! 
 So, if we read in a French encyclopaedia
1
 that no concept of education has 
been shaped without a philosophical background, we can rightfully add that, at least 
in Romania, the extraction of philosophy from education cannot do without (chair) 
philosophers and their audience, eager for building institutions. For philosophy for 
them – as well as the teaching of philosophy and its institutions – is indeed a sort of 
object or thing, that they shape or build as they are required to by the market. 
Because this is all that lies in their “skills”.  
 However, authentic philosophy has always had, and will also have, if not a 
market, then its agora! Of course, it is perhaps also true that its traffic (of 
merchandise) is more difficult to measure. Let us say, by the number of copies of 
newly printed books or the masses of audience of lectures or university students.  
 It is also true that philosophy is usually claimed not to result in any kind of 
real and actual knowledge…  And also that the insights of philosophy cannot 
actually be applied or “used” for anything. Well, one of the most important targets 
of this contribution – as well – is to refute this statement!2 It is still my experience 
                                                                                                                              
things have of course a clear “message” on the actual “rights” and circumstances of the 
public use of the mind! 
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 See Encyclopédie Philosophique Universelle, vol. I.: Univers Philosophique, ed. André 
Jacob (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1997). 
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 Humboldt’s concept of the university is traditionally criticized for not paying attention to 
the usefulness or direct applicability of the education and training that takes place there, and 
also, that it puts philosophy in the centre. It is of course impossible to think that the 
Humboldtian idea of the research university, greatly founded on Kant and Schelling, would 
think of the education and training it offers as “useless”. Rather, one should say that the 
Humboldtian concept of the university was not “surpassed”, but simply … forgotten! And it 
was forgotten in such a way that, concentrating on “easier” possibilities in a Heideggerian 
sense, they did not repeat it, or were more and more incapable of repeating it. For it is not 
easy at all to accomplish the idea rooted in Kant’s thoughts, formulated by Schelling and 
institutionally founded by Wilhelm von Humboldt – especially for the need of the 
proliferating number of universities – that the university professor in his lectures creates 
science directly before the students, as if right in front of their eyes! And he does not 
“teach” some sorts of “subjects”, “disciplines” or “specializations”! Such a thing can of 
course pose problems too for the audience. (István Fehér M. has dedicated a highly 
and opinion that we realize precisely because of our seriousness and engagement 
with the weight of our always “personal”, determined existential problems that no 
kind of “spiritual corpus”, as an impersonal “reply”-mechanism, theory or solution 
algorithm provided by “education” is possible in connection with them, which 
would just be appropriated and then kept in permanent use and operation.  
 Insofar I can fully agree with the Bologna process. Namely, with the fact 
that it promotes life-long learning. Let me note: philosophy – when it actually 
happened – has always been professing this for at least two and half thousand 
years… 1 In this way alone can the re-inquiring and re-formulating encounter with 
the meaning and, why not, power of philosophy and philosophizing become 
“possible” as well as actual again.  
 However, the case is completely different if, instead philosophy, the 
universities and schools (not only the secondary schools) teach mere disciplines, or 
– directly or indirectly – mentality. (Of which, of course, we cannot speak in the 
plural, no matter how many there are). Because both – disciplines and mentality – 
only waste away the inquiry that leads towards the above mentioned insights. That 
is: inquiry itself. Nonetheless, this is one of the most significant aspects of the 
university education of philosophy, both in Romanian and in Hungarian, in the 
Romanian education system. I am thinking about the fact that doctrinal religious 
education is compulsory in Romania, to the best of my knowledge singularly in 
Europe, from elementary school to the end of secondary school (age 18). In addition 
to violating human rights – since children ideologically indoctrinated ever since age 
6 or 7 should have the rights to decide freely and openly for themselves in such 
matters – this of course also tailors, a priori and determinately, the possible horizons 
of inquiry, directions and inclinations of questions and answers for people who have 
grown up this way. So one of the most serious problems that I face as a professor of 
philosophy is that students seem to lose, year by year, the open inclination for 
questioning, or that most of the students’ “own” questions are formulated in a yet 
hardly movable religious and theological determination and framework. 
 All the more so because, in strong connection with this, the “science” 
disciplines of school education (like biology or physics) are also taught avoiding the 
problematization of theories or ideas that can be relevant for philosophy or 
mentality. That is to say, such things are left completely in the hands of teachers of 
religious education, trained and permanently controlled by the churches – I repeat, in 
all schools from Romania invariably – for an entire 12 years of the life-history of 
children ages 6 to 18, a decisive period from all points of view! This is joined with 
the dry instrumentalism of social sciences and “citizenship” disciplines in secondary 
school, and a single year of philosophy education. This again is almost exorbitant, 
which the current philosophy textbook, accepted also in Hungarian, is teeming with 
objective mistakes and errors, next to lacking any standards of thinking or criticism. 
                                                                                                                              
documented and insightful book containing also critical remarks about the matter, entitled 
Schelling – Humboldt, Idealismus und Universität, Mit Ausblicken auf Heidegger und die 
Hermeneutik [Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, New York: P. Lang, Europäischer Verlag der 
Wissenschaften, 2007]). 
1
 It is enough to just think of Aristotle’s concept of phronesis, which says the same thing.  
 It is no wonder then that the spirituality of the “subjects” taught at the 
university of philosophy are also required and promoted in the same spirit, adapted 
to such a pre-defined “public opinion”. What they only seem to be quiet about is that 
this – I repeat: real and actual – “public opinion” has not simply “grown by itself”, 
but it was cultivated and bred. Only that few people wish or choose to know about it. 
And even less problematize it. The least problematized is that fact that these are 
precisely those power factors – not merely ideological and symbolic – which 
actually guide, at least for the time being, the often mentioned “philosophy labour 
market”. Including the “popularity” and catchment area of the university of 
philosophy also! That is, they also define the “numbers”, “consistency” and 
“quality” of those who attend it and graduate from it.  
 As for the labour market, it is definitely not a kind of agora where people 
freely debate or compete over jobs posted in the name and interest of truth. So most 
graduates of the university of philosophy of Cluj find – temporary or full-time – 
employment as secondary school teachers, at various foundations, societies, public 
institutions and political organizations, or in the press. The vast majority of these of 
course also stands under direct or indirect political, ideological or religious 
supervision (and that of the public opinion generated by these). That is to say, these 
probably also hardly long for “autonomous individuals”… It may well happen 
however, that the case is also valid for the opposite direction. So that it would not be 
superfluous to check how far those who were ambitious or lucky enough to meet the 
open or silent requirements of the labour market with their philosophy diploma have 
reached their “happiness” on this account. Or rather they have to deny themselves 
because of this day after day? But it is precisely this that proves that one can quite 
resourcefully influence the shaping of the labour market, instead of just lagging 
behind its external and usually instrumental requirements mediated by (not 
“uninterested”) offices and institutions.  
 However, philosophy does and must have its “own interests” – as Kant puts 
it – and it must protect and represent these interests by the public use of the mind, 
and primarily precisely by doing philosophy. The decisive role in this process 
nowadays would go not to chair philosophy, but to university philosophy, or the 
university of philosophy. Since neither the Romanian Academy, nor any of the 
Romanian universities have no serious research institutions for philosophy, it is 
perhaps time to think about the creation, or at least lobby for the creation of a 
research institution independently from state- or private universities, or 
“foundations” long expropriated by politics or ideologies. And where the most 
talented and engaged (young) researchers would finally find employment. Instead of 
the “reliable” and “predictable” people, the descendents of historical families of our 
little community, who are only good at the dry science of philosophy. For the single 
clear reason that they might “research” subjects of their own fields of interest in a 
genuinely philosophical inquiry, following a system of applications. Or simply: to 
“just” philosophize! 
 The worries usually mechanically arising at this, that these subjects and 
researches would probably lack public utility or applicability – of course, only from 
the perspective of those who always seem to have very accurate information as to 
the deep functions and tasks of our “culture” and “history”, but who, in spite of this, 
are never capable of presenting truly meaningful and alive creative strategies instead 
of illusions – could only be put to rest by paraphrasing Heidegger: philosophy, 
although never really “timely” or journalistically “actual”, always pinpoints its own 
age with sharp accuracy. Meaning the truly real and central questions and problems 
of its age. “Philosophy” is a “useless”, meaningless or empty endeavour only if it is 
not really philosophy, but wrongly called so! So a periodical of the research 
institution called for above could also be published, and it is my conviction that it 
would soon become of the richest and most alive publications of thinking in the 
region. People from many places living with the awareness and urge of the 
constraint of thinking would probably soon send their analyses. For, I repeat: 
“philosophy” is only a seemingly “useless”, meaningless and empty endeavour if it 
is not philosophy, but something wrongly called so out of habit! 
 However, this only illustrates that the name of philosophy is still attractive 
today in certain respects! Together with all the traps of such an attraction. How else 
could it be explained that we are repeatedly told on more and more channels that 
almost all production or service companies or all institutions that think highly of 
themselves have their own “philosophies”? There is nothing wrong with this in 
itself, since we could even think that they mean the articulated and meaningful 
existence of that company within the wider connections of the world, also with a 
reference to its future.  
The problem lies rather in the silencing away of the question whether these 
companies or businesses also have a thinker as an extra to their “philosophy”? The 
problem is not merely that the “philosophy” of companies, fashion salons or gyms is 
actually only an empty marketing manoeuvre, but much rather that this way the 
monster of the thinker-deprived philosophy has been formed and has been 
gaining more and more ground! 
Since philosophy – and also “philosophizing” – no longer needs a thinker, it 
will do with a “professional” or “expert” – trained of course necessarily as a 
manager as well –, who knows also how to use the mere term and conceptual means 
– “word-things” in Gadamer’s term – of philosophy in order to merely “employ” 
“philosophy” without thinking,1 and what is more, directly as a successful 
motivation of the lack of thinking.  
 It is a question therefore whether is it not the same that happens in chair 
philosophy – as well as professional philosophy? Namely, is it not indeed a thinker-
deprived “philosophy” and “philosophizing” which happens then? And it may be 
that the essential and real community and interconnectedness of these two, originally 
probably not very different tendencies explains why – despite those said above – the 
name of “philosophy” still corresponds today to superfluous, void and 
“meaningless” occupations, complicating life and things for no avail. Or, as Erasmus 
used to say: a blatant “folly”.  
                                                 
1
 It may also have a role in this – as pointed out by Heidegger not very long ago – that we 
know very little about what it means to think, or what thinking is at all. See Martin 
Heidegger, Was heisst Denken?, fifth, revised edition (Tübingen: Max Niemayer Verlag, 
1997), 175. 
In spite of this, it is my conviction that the meditation about the teaching of 
philosophy and university philosophy has – even today – no other way than the 
reflection on the possible “philosophical nature” of the very teaching of 
philosophy. For, in case of philosophy, the question comes more specifically: what 
is the relationship between education by philosophy on the one hand, and 
“teaching” philosophy, or more precisely, “teaching” how to guide one to reach 
philosophy?  
In times like this of course the “difference” that Kant made between 
philosophy taken in sensu scholastico and in sensu cosmopolitico is almost 
automatically pulled out and discussed anew. The calling of this 
differentiation, beyond the ramifications of conceptual differences, should 
have been precisely to make it clear: philosophy cannot in fact be either 
taught, or learnt… For that part of philosophy which can be taught as 
historical or mental knowledge a priori coming from others is, albeit not 
without content, but devoid of actual meanings.
1
  
 Apart from the fact that such things are usually read in contexts which 
aim rather to somehow legitimize the “chair philosophy” saved by the name 
of university philosophy, I think that these ways of interpretations avoid 
precisely the hermeneutical core of things. Since most often we tend to forget 
that these profound and meaningful thoughts of Kant are contained and 
emphasized in his university lectures – that is, in the physical presence of 
Kant and his eager audience. Therefore in a highly determined way!
2
 And 
what is more, in connection to subjects precisely as “metaphysics” or “logic”! 
 But what would be the sense of speaking – and loudly too – about the 
“unteachability” and “unlearnability” of philosophy as a “teacher”, a 
lecturer…? Certainly nothing! So, no doubt, something utterly different has 
to happen or be discussed there. For Kant says in this hermeneutic situation 
that: everything that forms the concept of school-philosophy can be taught 
and learnt… While on the other hand, although not useless at all, this still 
lacks the proper, sui generis meaning. So it lacks precisely that the 
knowledge and skills, proved by their the passing-on, learning and practicing 
– and thus connected also to “maxims”3 – be articulated with reference to, 
and projected on the universal (cosmopoliticus) objectives and senses of 
mankind. 
 These objectives however – amidst which thus the possibility of any 
meaning can only be constituted – appear not as “maxims” but as questions 
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 See also the systematic writing of Fehér M., István: A filozófia tanítása (The teaching of 
philosophy) in Iskolai filozófia Magyarországon a XVI-XIX. században (School philosophy 
in Hungary in the 16
th
 –19th century), ed. András Mészáros (Bratislava [Pozsony]: Kalligram, 
2003), 9–23. 
2
 That is, precisely so as, with Schelling’s words mentioned above, science comes into being 
in front of the audience! 
3
 “Maxims” are the inner, subjective principles of the choice among various objectives.  
(also) for Kant. So we could say that the – currently external – “difference” 
of school and universal philosophy, that is, precisely the difference between 
thinking taken in the sense of maxims or thinking and life itself taken as 
original questioning! Such a “difference” which the actual philosophy, in 
sensu eminenti, besides stating and outlining, always also exceeds and 
eliminates, at least with regard to itself. And this cannot be “taught” because 
there is nothing to “teach” about such kinds of questions or questioning! 
 Aristotle emphasizes both in the Categories and in the Topics that 
categorial questions – or more precisely the questions validated and 
represented by the categories themselves – are not dialectical. Therefore in 
the sense of dialectical or erotetic edification they cannot and should not be 
dealt with… Because they simply cannot be answered with yes or no, 
affirmation or negation. On the other hand, if we do not ask these 
questions… then we can never know or understand why we humans ask 
questions and answer them all the time… 
 The case is then probably than contents can be taught, while meanings 
cannot. Because these can only be inquired for – otherwise they will never 
even speak. Then how can they outline and constitute themselves without 
questioning? As something which can simply be handed over from one 
shoulder to the other? As a simple formula or algorithm in function.  
 Well, this is precisely what Kant was thinking about aloud in the 
presence of his students. So he did not simply imparted or even less simply 
lectured about some “subject” – one that was made more attractive or fluent 
by rhetorical means –, but he explicitly interrogated, questioned it at that very 
time. This is why it is probably not accidental – as also experienced by his 
diligent exegetes – that the greatest of all questions of meaning, namely 
“What is man?” is formulated precisely in Kant’s university lectures, and 
not in some “scholarly” study wrapped in mere previous numbness.1 He does 
not only provide his students eager for wisdom with serious warnings clad in 
terminological differentiations. 
 Meanwhile Kant always emphasizes still that the true philosopher is 
the practical philosopher! Which again means something completely different 
there than proficiency in sensu scholastico in the “discipline” or texts of 
practical philosophy, even if it is called The Critique of Practical Reason. On 
the contrary, this is the only direct way – the way of essential thinking – to 
the articulation of philosophy and the university of philosophy as a place and 
forum of freedom.  
 However, these days there are more and more voices telling us that 
some university professors should be more mindful of the fact that not all the 
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 See Immanuel Kant, Introduction to Logic (New York: Philosophical Library, 2013), 
especially Chapter III entitled Conception of Philosophy in General.  
students who apply to the department of philosophy wish to make contact 
with philosophy so-to-say “for the sake of philosophy”…, but for making use 
of it in some other field. Therefore it is unnecessary and tiresome to place too 
much emphasis on the “philosophical nature” of philosophy… 
 But what does it actually mean that someone wants to learn 
philosophy not “for the sake of philosophy” but for some other reason, or that 
– now from the perspective of university lectures – philosophy is taught so 
that it may lead not to philosophy, but to something else? But how could 
anyone “use” or market philosophy in any other “theoretical” or “practical” 
field if not creating in the meantime a special relationship with their own 
specific questions and urges, or not becoming aware of the fact that their 
own questions and projects inevitably connected to these organically belong 
to their own selves?! 
 Whereas the pertinence of our – certainly always definite – questions to 
ourselves, and of ourselves to our existential, historical and horizon-like questions is 
precisely (one of) the most essential philosophy(ies), as we have seen in fact at 
Kant as well, and to acknowledge this, there is a need for a most profound and 
authentic encounter with philosophy! As I have said, we saw the same at Kant too. 
And of course no kind of “science of philosophy”, “chair philosophy” or 
“professional philosophy” can ever possibly lead – and indeed never leads – to any 
such thing! Which – in spite of this and at the same time – always essentially 
radiates from any authentic gesture of philosophizing! 
 Now, what derives from this for me is precisely that the problem of the 
teaching of philosophy – and I mean not exclusively at the university – and 
cultivation of philosophy is one and the same thing! Actually, the main question – 
which has been disquieting me for quite some time – is that: the basic problem of the 
application of philosophy is not – and cannot be by its nature – how an already 
“existing”, “ready-made” philosophy, philosophical “language” or “discipline” used 
for understanding something which inevitably always boasts with its new and 
particular presence?! On the contrary, the most important question for philosophical 
(self) reflection itself – that is, the teaching of philosophy – is how to make 
philosophy appropriate for facing the sui generis and “necessary” novelty of the 
presentness of something problematic, oppressive and challenging – that is, truly 
questionable –, relevant also from the point of view of philosophical tradition?! And 
that, by this – for us humans – philosophy opens up to us the windows of new 
existential possibilities!  
 But let me ask: is it not this the fundamental “problem” connected to the 
meanings and possibilities of the teaching of philosophy? Most certainly, it is! This 
is why I call this both “philosophical” and existential possibility applied 
philosophy. Completely independently from what other may consider “applied 
philosophy” based on trends, or how relevant or irrelevant it is on the conference 
stages of contemporary philosophical fashion-shows! 
 For it is still most important to admit and have it accepted that the true 
subjects of philosophy – as well as its tribulations, attempts and stakes – are not 
found primarily in books, studies or the inner “problematic” states of the “science”. 
Nor in various educational, political (strategic or tactical) directions… Instead, the 
actual subjects of philosophy stand in the explicit and articulated, reflexive bringing 
to actuality of the existential and historical challenges in action. And possibly this is 
the most essential, “useful” and applicable thing in “other fields” as well that 
philosophy students can acquire or make their own – their own ousia – in the 
community of the university of philosophy, with the philosophizing help of their 
“educators” in the efforts of thinking, as “the students of their own minds”.  
While of course they also take themselves – as autonomous individuals – “into their 
possession” in the questioning articulation of the responsibly desired direction of 
their possibilities of being. Regardless of whether these students applied to the 
university because of philosophy or for other reasons! And of course also 
irrespective of whether this university is a traditional, “physical” one, or a “virtual” 
university of philosophy.  
 Now, for this very reason, namely because of the actual historical work that 
one does over oneself necessarily in all respects in the always questionable historical 
direction and interests of human freedom which always points beyond itself, 
philosophy or philosophizing cannot be just a kind of “craft”. Let alone 
“profession”. Therefore the university of philosophy also cannot be a higher 
(professional) school of such a “professional training” where the applied 
mechanisms could work year-by-year as an institution, as if on a conveyor belt. 
Where the diplomas gained at the end of “factory-structured” processes and 
technologies of production, training and instruction would prove such a “skill” 
connected to the “tasks” and “profession” of philosophy. For what kind of 
“instruction”, “training” or “profession” could “specialize” in amending or avoiding 
the problems, disorders, insufficiencies, breaks of man with, let’s say, death, dying, 
freedom, possibility, history, secret, etc.? Such “problems” always  turn out never to 
lack difficulties and “problematicality” – so they would really give a job for licensed 
“professionals” and “experts” forever – but this way they would just ward off that 
essential consideration that this somehow unceasably and unavoidably occurring 
“problematicality” – or more accurately: questionability, question and questioning – 
belongs to the very essence of philosophy just as questionability belongs necessarily 
and essentially – that is, ontologically – to the being of the questioning being. While 
there is not, and cannot be any kind of professional, procedural, or production 
protocol, regulation, rule or prescription which can be applied just like that, 
“professionally”, and adjusted to any situation.  
 This does not mean of course that philosophy would no longer have any 
kind of “use” or “utility”. On the contrary, it is only and exclusively the clarifying 
and always reiterated, historically always undertaken, questioning and re-
questioning efforts of philosophy which can secure this ground – as well as 
atmosphere and mood – on the bases and horizons of which the possible human 
meanings of being and meaningful being can truly be outlined.  
 Of course, the “cultivation” and “teaching” of philosophy as a “profession” 
or even more as a “craft” is not only more easily and light-heartedly accessible – so 
smoother – but also more “efficient”, productive and profitable. Because it is 
weightless. Therefore it is simpler to create the expected, “timely” and accounted-
for illusion of an “attentive”, “well informed”, “sensitive” and “responsible” 
“creation” and pedantry of things philosophical. And, what is more, in a way that it 
would correspond – not to the weight of questions, but – to the explicit or implicit, 
but “respectable” and “responsible” “expectations” of all institutional, company or 
professional offices or publicity.  
 Still, it is in this above outlined way that I would like to understand – and 
not merely as a kind of naïve self-conceit – what Kant says about the uniqueness 
and “singularity” of philosophy. Namely, the philosophy is the only one that has an 
inner value, and philosophy gives value to all other sciences. For there are no 
calculations or algorithms or axiomatic systems which could tell us what 
mathematics is, of what is its meaning for human life; of there are no experiments or 
theories which could tell us what physics is… nor are there such “reactions” which 
would inform us in laboratories about the nature and meaning of chemistry. Just as 
there is no “device” or instrument about the meaning of technology, nor are there 
works of art to define what a work of art is. And just as theologies do not “ground” 
the religions, since these are all based on revelations coming from outside, and in 
revelations they find the roots and meanings of their faith. It is philosophy alone that 
can necessarily and inevitably find its own foundations in the all-time question and 
its permanent reiteration “within” itself, inquiring about its own nature and 
meanings, and of course always pointing beyond “itself”. Only thus, and only for 
this reason can philosophy lend “value to all other sciences”.  
 So the meditation about the university of philosophy or teaching philosophy 
at the university has visibly no other way than: the actual meditation about the 
current position and chances of philosophizing itself. Which must of course also 
surface the current urges and challenges of philosophizing.  
 This is what will probably need to guide the analyses, debates and “policies” 
connected to the university of philosophy as a possible university (philosophy) 
institution. And not the other way round. Otherwise nothing more will happen than 
the creation of newer versions of the usual “academic” philosophical “laboratories 
and factories”. In which – besides their being in fact the objectives and requirements 
of education and academic policy, or sandwich fillings between public mood and 
public will – there is a real chance that they – or we – would actually teach 
misosophia instead of philosophia as the “philosophy of the academic-university 
ghetto”.  
 For this is increasingly the case lately. Many “graduates” want to directly 
get rid of the memory and experience that they once attended a so-called university 
of philosophy. Just as many are those who no longer think it is important to “finish” 
their studies. Which, by the way, means a no greater “ordeal” than earning their 
diplomas by producing some three dozens of pages of a “text” on a somewhat 
“philosophical subject”… Or the continuation of these “studies” on MA level. While 
the respect, if not honour, of titles – “MA”, “PhD” – is still preserved.  
 This is only possible of course because we slowly not only treat philosophy 
as an object – or rather, dissimulate it with institutional headings, stamps and 
commitments – but turn it directly into a lie at the universities! 
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